The purpose of this paper is to relate inservice inspection @SI) reliability and frequency directly to risk so as to balance the risk associated with IS1 over a set of components. This approach is based on the fundamental assumption that the purpose of IS1 is to detect and correct a degraded condition, which, until it is corrected, leads to an increase in risk. The increased risk is a function of the consequences of failure and the t i m e to detect the degraded condition. The IS1 strategy for a set of components is said to be risk balanced (or simply, balanced) if the increased risk is constant over the set of components.
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The starting point for this approach is the notion of baseline failure probability, denoted by P,. For any component C , failure probability per unit time (usually, per year) is denoted by P. The operational definition of Po is that no decrease in P is possible if P<Po while a decrease toP=Po is possible if P>P,. In practice, P, is usually equal to the failure probability of the component if it is not degraded below its design capability. However, if the design failure probability is P' , but IS1 is not able to detect or correct a failure probability unless it is larger than some P," > P' , then the baseline failure probability should be set equal to p 0 ' . From this fundamental assumption, it follows that IS1 serves no purpose unless P>P,.
To derive the basic balancing equation, assume that the failure probability of a to P=P,+AP immediately following an inspection and remains at this level until detected and corrected, where A P > O is a constant. Define: T, = expected t h e to detect A P using IS1 techniques L = consequence due to failure ofC ' hB = expected incremental integrated The expected time to detect A P is, in general, a function of A P because the probability of detecting A P during any IS1 depends on A P.
The use of T R to measure the effect of an undetected increase in failure probability is motivated by consideration of the expected consequence due to failure of C.
If the faSure probability per unit time o f c is P and persists for a period 5, the probability that C fails during 5 is T,P, provided that T,.P is small. [Strictly speakmg, T,*P is only an approximation to the failure probability, and the accuracy of this approximation improves a s 5 . P approaches zero. However, for values of T,*P encountered in practice, the approximation is excellent and is used without hrther qualification.] Thus, the expected consequence X due to the possible failure of c over the period T , is -Since P has units of probability per unit time, the product 3 . P is dimensionless and, therefore, X has the same units as L. We call X the expected integrated risk. If P=Po then R,=5-Po*L is the baseline integrated risk until detection. Since P is elevated above P, by an amount A P for an expected time 5 , d R is the expected increase in the integrated risk during the period that P remains elevated above P,. Eq. (6) shows that there is a tradeoff between fi and Poi. They are inversely related, so that a decrease in the probability of detection can be compensated for by an increase in the frequency of inspection, and vice versa.
Equations (4) and (6) 
